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Improving the Performance of Natural Resource Taxation in Developing 
Countries 
 
Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper explores the administrative challenges posed to developing countries as a result 
of the increasing emphasis in fiscal regimes for natural resource extraction since the Second 
World War on income-based taxes, including both corporate income and resource rent taxes, 
as opposed to royalties. The paper identifies both the political consequences and technical 
challenges (particularly in the area of enforcement of arm’s length pricing in the natural 
resource context). 
 
Politically, the paper argues that reduced reliance on royalties has clouded the imagery of 
natural resource taxation as a means of ensuring governments fair market compensation for 
the alienation of their non-renewable resource endowments, and instead has rendered 
natural resource taxation increasingly vulnerable to the political scepticism that has 
surrounded corporate income taxation in recent decades. The greater exposure of natural 
resource levies to this scepticism appears to have led to high levels of toleration of corporate 
tax avoidance by governments at all levels of economic development. From a technical 
perspective, the paper argues that income-based levies are intrinsically far more vulnerable 
to avoidance than royalties, posing substantial administrative challenges to those developing 
countries that wish to achieve high levels of tax compliance. 
 
Today, natural resource fiscal regimes around the world typically employ a mixture of 
royalties and income-based levies; this mixture is intended to afford a balance of protection 
against financial risks to governments as well as investors. Despite the shortcomings of 
income-based levies, this paper does not advocate that the practice of mixed fiscal regimes 
be abandoned. Nevertheless, the paper argues that in the interest of greater administrability, 
the mix of fiscal instruments might be adjusted to some extent in favour of royalties, 
especially to the extent royalties include rates that adjust with product prices, so that their 
incidence correlates to a substantial extent with investors’ net income. 
 
In addition, the paper suggests technical means by which developing countries might 
improve the performance of income-based natural resource levies. In particular, using the 
Norwegian reference pricing system for North Sea Oil as a model, the paper argues that 
developing country governments might obtain greater control over revenue losses by 
adopting ‘administrative pricing’ regimes. Under these the government, rather than the 
taxpayer, takes the initiative in establishing arm’s-length product prices based on both posted 
price benchmarks and research into local pricing conditions (including, for example, local 
variations in product quality, and prevailing industry practices with respect to sales contract 
duration). Although administrative pricing regimes are now most common with respect to oil 
and gas, the paper recommends that the use of these regimes be expanded to hard minerals 
taxation. The paper also explores the extent to which developing country governments might 
apply principles of administrative pricing not only to the determination of product prices, but 
also to the arm’s-length limitation of related-party expenses for services and supplies, as well 
as the control of excessive interest expense. 
 
Keywords: natural resources; oil and gas; petroleum; mining; fiscal regimes; transfer pricing. 
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Introduction 
 
The extraction of a country’s natural resources can provide public revenue that is central to 
the realisation of the country’s hopes for economic development. In raising revenue from the 
extraction of resources, a country’s government does not only act in the exercise of its 
sovereign taxing authority, but also in a proprietary capacity as seller of non-renewable 
assets on behalf of the country’s population. Failures of revenue-raising in the extractive 
sector are therefore especially regrettable, as they represent the denial of fair compensation 
for the disposition of the country’s endowment of wealth. 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the nature of fiscal measures that governments use 
in the natural resource sector has changed, and the change has magnified the difficulties that 
governments face in administering and enforcing the taxation of natural resource extraction. 
Historically, governments depended heavily on a particular kind of fiscal instrument – 
royalties – to raise revenue from the extraction of natural resources.1 Royalties are usually 
based on the gross value of the product that is extracted and sold by a miner or driller.2 In 
the post-War decades, however, governments have been relying relatively less on royalties 
in seeking to generate revenue from extractive operations, and more on various kinds of 
levies that are based, not on the gross, but instead on the net income that a company 
derives from the extraction of product. Today, although practices vary, governments typically 
obtain natural resource revenue from a combination of royalties and income-based levies. 
The income-based levies used are of several different kinds, including: (i) application to the 
extractive company of a country’s regular corporate income tax; (ii) resource rent taxes or 
other taxes that are designed to apply only after the extractive company has achieved 
profitability from its investment; and (iii) production-sharing contracts or other arrangements 
in which the company and host government agree to divide income that arises from a 
project.3 Sometimes different income-based levies are applied to a particular project 
simultaneously, typically along with royalties. 
 
The movement towards greater reliance on income-based taxation reflects important 
considerations of economic efficiency.4 Whereas royalties become payable immediately 
upon the start of extraction of marketable product from a project, income-based levies do not 
become payable until after the extractive company has begun to realise net profits from its 
operations. Therefore, by relying relatively less on royalties and more heavily on income-
based levies, a government reduces the extractive company’s risk that it will be taxed even 
on a loss-making investment. This protection is expected to encourage new investment in 
natural resource development, and lower the costs of inducing extractive companies to 
participate in the exploitation of a country’s resources. 
 
The economic efficiency of income-based taxation when realised, however, is bought at a 
price. Income-based natural resource taxes are much more difficult for governments to 
                                                 
1  See Guj et al. (2013: 51). 
2  e.g. under a royalty of 10%, if a driller extracts and sells oil with a total fair market value of $10 million, the driller will 
owe a royalty of $1 million. In practice, not all royalties are based on the value of extracted product. In some cases, 
especially for low-value products like gravel, royalties might be stated as a particular monetary amount per volume (e.g. 
per ton or per barrel) of product that is extracted. Sometimes, in addition, countries will label as ‘royalties’ levies that are 
based not on gross revenue but on a company’s net profits; these levies are in substance forms of income taxation and 
should be analysed accordingly. Royalties based on gross product value (i.e. ad valorem royalties), however, are the 
most common form of royalties, and can be taken as paradigmatic for analytical purposes in comparing royalties with 
income-based taxes. 
3  For a concise explanation of production sharing contracts, see Sunley et al. (2002: 7-9). Useful summaries of various 
kinds of contract between governments and developers in connection with, respectively, oil and gas and hard minerals 
extraction, are available in Openoil (2012) and International Senior Lawyers Project et al. (2013). 
4  The economic advantages of income-based taxation are explained in detail in Boadway and Keen (2010) and Guj et al. 
(2013). In addition, a useful concise summary is available in Sunley et al. (2002). 
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enforce effectively than royalties. The move towards the use of income-based levies has 
rendered natural resource taxation increasingly vulnerable to the serious problems of 
revenue erosion that have plagued income-based corporate taxation generally around the 
world, within and outside the natural resource sector. In part, the elevated vulnerability 
derives from the basic arithmetic of income-based taxation. As demonstrated by an example 
in Section 1.1, because income-based taxes are levied not on a taxpayer’s gross revenue 
but instead on the relatively narrow difference (margin) between a company’s gross income 
and its deductible costs, even small understatements by a taxpayer of the market value of 
extracted products, or small overvaluations of the taxpayer’s properly deductible expenses, 
can reduce the company’s tax liability very substantially. The seriousness of this vulnerability 
is magnified by the fact that extractive companies typically engage heavily in transactions 
with other members of their multinational groups, in which the companies have substantial 
opportunity to undervalue gross revenue and overstate the value of properly deductible 
costs.5 
 
In addition, the movement towards greater reliance on income-based taxation in the natural 
resource sector has exposed natural resource taxation to materially greater political 
vulnerability. Increased reliance on income-based levies has diluted the imagery of natural 
resource taxation as a means of ensuring fair compensation in the proprietary sale of a 
country’s non-renewable resources, and has instead elevated the imagery of government 
acting in the exercise of its general power to tax. Natural resource taxation has therefore 
become more beholden to: (i) procedural rules and traditions in corporate tax administration 
that have evolved over many years to constrain governments over-reaching in the exercise 
of their taxing powers; and (ii) intellectual and political scepticism of the merits of corporate 
income taxation as a general matter, particularly in the international setting, which has led to 
widespread toleration of serious dysfunction in the administration of income-based business 
taxes.  
 
This paper considers ways by which, despite both the intrinsic vulnerability of income-based 
taxation to erosion and political attitudes that may be hostile to reform, developing countries 
might reduce revenue losses in the extractive sector. The paper: (i) describes the technical 
and political difficulties that have accompanied greater reliance on income-based levies in 
the extractive sector; (ii) explores an administrative pricing model that Norway has used for 
many years in valuing extracted crude oil for tax purposes, and that other countries have 
adopted more recently; and (iii) considers ways in which the administrative pricing model 
might be expanded to the valuation of extracted commodities other than crude oil, and to the 
valuation of properly deductible taxpayer costs. At several points the discussion identifies 
areas in which additional country-specific research on tax laws and administrative practices 
might substantially benefit the design and implementation of reform. 
 
Currently, natural resource fiscal regimes around the world typically include both royalties 
and income-based levies, in an effort to balance the financial risks of governments and 
investors. Despite the administrative shortcomings of income-based levies on which it 
                                                 
5  The process of estimating fair market prices in transactions between related parties for tax purposes is usually referred 
to as transfer pricing. The topic of transfer pricing has been highly controversial in tax policy discussions for many years, 
with debate often focusing on the question of whether the need to evaluate prices in related-party transactions on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis imposes unrealistic enforcement demands on tax administrations. Often, discussion of 
transfer pricing policy centres on whether the current transactional approach should be replaced by a formulary 
approach, under which taxable income is apportioned among taxing jurisdictions by reference to the relative levels of 
business activity that multinational groups conduct in different jurisdictions. See generally Avi-Yonah et al. (2009). The 
ongoing debate over how best to structure transfer pricing laws, however, involves numerous issues that extend beyond 
the scope of this paper. Also, the formulary approach to transfer pricing, even if it could be made workable for the 
purpose of international corporate income taxation generally, would for a number of important reasons not be suited for 
use in the extractive sector - see Dayle Siu et al. (2015). Therefore, to avoid invoking controversies that are not 
germane to its analysis, this paper generally refers to the pricing of extracted product and deductible expenses in the 
extractive sector as a process of valuation, and avoids the term transfer pricing unless the context plainly requires 
otherwise. 
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focuses, this article is not intended to suggest retreat from the practice of using fiscal 
regimes that are mixed in this manner. It is suggested, however, that owing to the intrinsic 
administrative difficulties of income-based levies, the mix of instruments probably should be 
adjusted to some extent in favour of greater reliance on royalties, especially if royalty rates 
are structured, as discussed below, so as to vary with product prices.6 In addition, the paper 
argues that substantial administrative improvements should be made to income-based 
natural resource levies in order to achieve reasonable protection for developing country 
governments against revenue losses from international base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
 
1  The heightened vulnerability of income-
based taxation to avoidance 
 
1.1 The sobering arithmetic of income-based taxation 
 
The intrinsic vulnerability of income-based levies to companies’ understatements of natural 
resource product prices can be illustrated by a brief example.7 Assume that, during a year, a 
company extracts ore that would be valued by a neutral and well-qualified appraiser at $100 
million. If the extracted product is subject to a 10 per cent royalty, then the revenue properly 
owing to the government is $10 million. Assume, however, that the taxpayer reports to the 
government that the extracted ore has a fair market value not of $100 million but of $92 
million, an understatement of 8 per cent. Because the revenue due under the royalty is 
directly proportional to the product’s fair market value as reported by the company, the 
government’s revenue also falls by 8 per cent – from $10 million to $9.2 million – for a 
shortfall of $800,000, as a result of the company’s understatement.  
 
Assume alternatively, however, that instead of a 10 per cent royalty, the company is subject 
in its mining operations to an income tax at a rate of 50 per cent. Assume further that the 
company’s annual expenses in its extractive operations are properly valued at $80 million. 
Therefore, if the product for the year is properly valued at $100 million, the taxpayer’s taxable 
profit will be $20 million, and the properly computed income tax liability will be $10 million 
(the same as the amount of the royalty earlier in this example). Under the income-based 
levy, however, if the taxpayer values the product at $92 million, taxable income is now 
reduced from $20 million to $12 million, and the tax is reduced from $10 million to $6 million, 
yielding a revenue shortfall to the government not of $800,000 but of $4 million. Thus, under 
the income-based tax an 8 per cent understatement of product value has reduced the 
government’s revenue yield not by 8 per cent but by 40 per cent. The arithmetic reason for 
this result is, of course, readily apparent. Whereas a royalty is applied to the gross value of 
the product extracted by a taxpayer, an income-based tax is applied to the taxpayer’s net 
profit, which will always be much less than the gross value of the extracted product. 
 
Income-based taxes, therefore, are significantly more vulnerable than royalties to even 
modest understatements by taxpayers of the value of their gross revenue. Moreover, as 
discussed further below, whereas the computation of royalties is not affected by the level of a 
taxpayer’s costs, under income-based taxation even relatively small overstatements of 
deductible costs can substantially reduce a taxpayer’s liabilities. 
 
  
                                                 
6  Keen and Mullins (2017: 34) suggest that recognition of the administrative challenges of income-based taxation ‘may … 
mean tilting the balance between profit-related taxes and royalties further towards the latter than might otherwise be the 
case, on the grounds that monitoring deductible costs is harder than monitoring revenues’. 
7  A similar example is found in Clausing and Durst (2015: 11). 
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1.2 Challenges in the valuation of extracted product 
 
It is sometimes thought that the valuation of most kinds of extracted product is a relatively 
simple and straightforward task, involving reference to posted prices that are publicly 
available for virtually every kind of commodity. These include, for example, the frequently 
cited West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent prices for crude oil, and a wide variety of 
prices for metals and metal ores that are posted daily by the London Metals Exchange and 
other market clearing houses around the world. 
 
A posted price, however, represents only an approximate starting point for estimating the fair 
market value of the product that is extracted from a particular mine or field. In order to 
translate the posted price of any commodity into an estimate of fair market value, it is 
necessary to adjust the posted price for a number of factors, including: (i) variances in the 
physical composition of the particular shipment of product (for example, the metal content of 
different ores, and the presence of impurities like sulphur in crude oil or silica in metals ores) 
from the benchmark physical composition on which the posted price is based; (ii) the 
geographic distance of the particular mine or oilfield from the nearest substantial market; and 
(iii) the contractual terms under which the product is to be sold (which in practice usually will 
involve agreement for the continued delivery of product for a specified and sometimes 
extended period of time, rather than the one-time spot purchase terms on which posted 
prices typically are based). Each of these necessary adjustments from posted prices poses 
significant technical challenges and requires the exercise of subjective judgement, even for 
the most seasoned and skillful minerals engineers and other experts. Moreover, the bands of 
uncertainty surrounding each of these adjustments tend to be large;8 taken together, the 
overall uncertainty as to market price in almost every real-life instance is sufficiently wide, 
given the arithmetic vulnerability of income-based taxes, to reduce a taxpayer’s liability very 
substantially. 
 
The problem of price uncertainty relating to differences in contractual terms is especially 
striking. The fair market value of a commodity can be greatly affected by the length of the 
contract under which the commodity is sold. Contracts for specified terms, as opposed to 
spot market transactions, contain within them the equivalent of a financial futures contract. 
The extent to which the pricing of a term contract will differ from the spot market price 
depends heavily on the historical price volatility of the commodity in question, as well as 
market expectations of future price movements at the time the term contract is executed. 
Moreover, in practice long-term mineral contracts vary widely in the extent to which prices 
per ton or barrel are fixed for the duration of the contract term, or are subject to resetting at 
specified intervals to reflect changes in spot market prices. Given the infinite range of 
variability in the durational terms of contracts for the sale of ore, crude oil or natural gas, the 
estimation of the market price that should properly be included in any particular contract is a 
matter of wide and speculative judgement.9 
                                                 
8  Although a detailed analysis of the factors that influence natural resource product prices is beyond the scope of this 
paper, some indication of the volatility of these factors can be found in the variability of some basic pricing indicators. 
e.g. the daily variation of futures prices of different durations provides an indication of the sensitivity of pricing to the 
term of a sales contract. See e.g. Barchart, Futures Prices for Iron Ore 62% Fe as of 26 July 2016, 
<barchart.com/futures/commodities/ITI> (over a 2½ year period of different maturities, futures price for iron ore varies 
within a band of $56.38 to $42.05 per ton, a band of variation of about 25%). For discussion of the complexities of 
valuing iron ore, see Shay (2017: 60-62). Some indication of the variability of product prices to differences in the 
physical composition and location of product is provided by changes over time in the relationship of Brent and WTI 
benchmark oil prices. During the period 2010 through 2015, the price premium (annual average) of Brent over WTI 
varied from a low of 0.2 percent to a high of 18.7 percent. US Energy Information Administration, 
<https:/www.eia.gov/nav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_a.htm>. 
9 The need for important, and often quite subjective, adjustments to posted prices in order to estimate fair market value 
suggests that the recent addition of a ‘Sixth Method’ for valuing natural resources to the OECD’s transfer pricing 
guidelines may be of only limited utility in many cases. (Guidance for application of the Sixth Method is provided at 
OECD (2015c: 51-54)). The Sixth Method authorises taxpayers and tax administrations to refer to posted prices as 
probative evidence in determining the fair market value of commodities for tax purposes. Because of the need for 
adjustments in translating posted prices to fair market value, however, the Sixth Method may provide only a starting 
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The vulnerability of income-based taxes to avoidance through the understatement of product 
prices is greatly magnified by the tax planning practices that multinational natural resource 
companies have adopted over the decades. Extractive companies that are members of 
multinational groups virtually never sell product from a mine or well directly to unrelated 
purchasers in transactions in which actual market prices could be observed.10 For example, 
an iron mining company that is part of a multinational group typically does not sell ore directly 
from a mine to unrelated steel companies, and an oil production company that is part of a 
multinational group typically does not sell crude oil directly from a field to an unrelated 
refiner. Instead, the extractive company first sells the product to a captive marketing 
company that the multinational group has established in a tax haven country – that is, a 
country that will not tax the marketing company’s profits. The captive marketing company 
then on-sells the product at a tax-sheltered profit, either to an unrelated refining or trading 
company or to another subsidiary within the multinational group. The use of the captive 
marketing company as intermediary in the sale of product is a legal fiction. Although sales of 
product to and from the captive marketing company are memorialised on paper, the physical 
product typically is not delivered to the marketing company, but is instead shipped directly 
from the mine or well to the smelter or refiner. However, because the captive marketing 
company takes legal ownership, even momentarily, the intermediary role of the marketing 
company is afforded recognition for tax purposes. 
 
For purposes of this discussion, the key point is that the price at which product is sold from 
the mine or well to the captive marketing company is not an arm’s-length, market-determined 
price. It is instead a controlled price that is set by the multinational group, typically by its tax 
department. The group has a large incentive to take advantage of all the relevant 
uncertainties and to understate the price, thus avoiding taxation in the country where the 
product was extracted. 
 
1.3 The problem of services, supplies and equipment obtained from related 
parties 
 
Extractive subsidiaries within multinational groups typically procure extensive technical and 
other services, as well as supplies and equipment, from other group members. For purposes 
of income-based taxation, taxpayers are permitted to claim deduction of the fair market value 
of these items. In practice, however, there has historically been a very large amount of 
controversy between tax authorities and taxpayers over whether taxpayers are claiming 
excessive deductions for services, supplies and equipment obtained from related parties.11 
 
As with sales of extracted product, multinational groups have developed widely used 
techniques involving the establishment of subsidiaries in tax havens, to magnify opportunities 
for tax avoidance that exploit uncertainty in the valuation of services and property sold 
between related parties.12 Multinational groups in all industries typically establish what 
sometimes are labelled hub or principal companies in tax haven jurisdictions.13 These 
companies, at least on paper, serve as intermediaries in purchasing both services and 
tangible property from members of their multinational group, and reselling them at a tax-
shielded profit to other members of the group. Under a hub arrangement, the group has a 
strong incentive to overstate the value of goods and services that subsidiaries purchase from 
                                                                                                                                                        
point for the valuation of product for tax purposes. This is likely to be true especially with respect to the valuation of hard 
minerals ores, the quality of which can vary significantly even among different shipments from the same mine. See the 
above footnote. 
10  The tendency for ‘first sales’ of extracted product to be sold to related parties, with consequent difficulties for revenue 
administration, has been recognised as a problem for many years. See Gillis (1982: 623). 
11  For extended discussion of this topic, see OECD (2010: ch. VII). 
12  For discussion of the importance of tax haven intermediaries in tax planning in the extractive sector, see Shay (2017: 
48-50, 60-63). 
13  United States Congress (2010) describes in detail a number of tax haven-based corporate structures that have been 
employed by multinational groups.  
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other group members, since: (i) the taxable income of the subsidiary that pays for the goods 
and services is reduced; and (ii) the hub company’s profits on the purchase and resale of 
services and property within the group are sheltered from taxation.  
 
The fair market valuation of services and property transferred among group members is 
subject to many kinds of uncertainty, which arise primarily from ambiguities in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and other bodies of law governing the issue of valuation for tax purposes.14 
Among the most important areas of uncertainty are the following:  
 
 The valuation of technical and administrative services. Extractive companies often make 
substantial use of technical services – for example, drilling and mining engineering 
services – that are provided by other members of their multinational groups. In addition, 
subsidiaries within natural resource groups in all industries, including natural resource 
extraction, make use of a number of administrative services provided by parent 
companies or other group members, including legal, personnel management and 
financial services. The law today leaves unresolved several important questions in the 
tax treatment of related-party services that are of substantial fiscal importance in an era 
of tax haven hub companies. These questions include: (i) whether the seller of services 
to other members of its multinational group is entitled to earn a profit from provision of the 
services, or is entitled instead only to reimbursement of its costs of providing the 
services; and (ii) if a profit is appropriate, how high it should be. In practice, taxpayers 
often claim the right to deduct markups on the costs of intragroup services in the range of 
8 to 10 per cent; given the arithmetic vulnerability of income-based taxation, the 
deduction of these markups can substantially reduce the revenue yield of an income-
based tax.  
 Insurance services. Often multinational groups establish subsidiaries that purport to 
provide property and casualty and other insurance coverage to group affiliates located 
around the world. In any particular case, under applicable tax laws, it can be difficult to 
determine whether an insurance policy written among commonly-owned companies 
represents a bona fide insurance service for which the insured company should be 
permitted to deduct premiums. The practical significance of this question is enhanced by 
the tax avoidance that is possible when, as is universal in practice, the captive insurance 
company in question is established in a tax haven, so that the payment of premiums can 
serve as a convenient means of profit shifting. 
 Hedging services. Often natural resource groups find it in their interest to hedge against 
declines in the price of the commodities in which the group deals.15 The hedging can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, using options, forward contracts and futures, all of 
which involve some financial cost. Although hedging benefits the multinational group as a 
whole, a group might claim that the cost of hedging should be allocated to the production 
companies within the group, thereby reducing those companies’ taxable income in the 
countries where extraction occurs. 
 Intangible property. In addition to charging for services, a multinational group may claim 
that production companies should be liable for deductible royalties for the use of the 
group’s technological know-how – for example, its engineering expertise. The tax 
avoidance potential of this kind of claim can be magnified by the group’s use of a tax 
haven subsidiary as an asserted holding company for the group’s intangible assets. 
 
Although the OECD has studied the question of deductions for related-party expenses 
intensively in recent years,16 transfer pricing laws today do not provide guidance that is 
                                                 
14  See generally OECD (2010: ch. VII). 
15 Tax issues arising from the hedging activities of extractive companies within multinational groups are discussed in Guj 
et al. (2013: 56-57) and International Monetary Fund (2012: 45). See also Readhead (2016b: 39-40). 
16  See OECD (2015c). 
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sufficient to resolve these uncertainties to any significant extent. The result in practice is that 
taxpayers resolve the uncertainties in their favour, resulting in substantial erosion of tax 
revenue.  
 
1.4 Interest on loans from related parties 
 
Legal uncertainty concerning the extent to which taxpayers may deduct interest on loans 
from related parties has led to severe difficulties in enforcing corporate income taxes around 
the world. In this area as well, multinational groups have magnified opportunities for tax 
avoidance through a strategy involving the establishment of group finance companies in tax 
havens. The group contributes large amounts of cash to the finance company, which then 
extends loans to affiliates around the world. Interest on the loans is deducted in the country 
of the borrower, yielding reductions in the borrower’s corporate tax liability, but there is no 
corresponding tax burden when the interest is received by the finance company in the tax 
haven jurisdiction. It costs the multinational group nothing (other than the legal costs of 
papering the necessary transactions) to engage in a group lending strategy of this kind; the 
only limiting factor is the extent to which the tax administration of the borrower’s country will 
tolerate the practice. Virtually all large multinational groups today make use of tax avoidance 
strategies centred on intragroup loans, and the volume of tax avoided around the world by 
these strategies is substantial.17 
 
Although tax avoidance through the use of related-party loans is very common under 
conventionally structured corporate income taxes, this kind of tax avoidance generally does 
not arise under resource rent taxation, because resource rent tax laws typically do not allow 
for the deduction of interest (although given that taxes that are labelled ‘resource rent taxes’ 
might be structured in a wide variety of ways, the governing statute should be reviewed to 
ascertain the treatment of interest deductions in any given instance) (Land 2010: 256). 
Nevertheless, even where resource rent taxes are used, natural resource fiscal regimes 
typically provide in addition for the application of a country’s traditionally structured corporate 
tax to extractive industry taxpayers. Consequently, the payment of interest on related-party 
loans results in serious tax avoidance under the natural resource fiscal regimes of virtually all 
countries around the world. 
 
Historically, corporate income tax laws have offered tax authorities with little effective means 
of controlling the proliferation of interest deductions using intragroup lending strategies. 
Typically, laws have permitted tax authorities to challenge companies’ deductions for interest 
if the taxpayers are overleveraged – that is, if they have incurred levels of debt greater than 
an unrelated lender would be willing to lend the borrowing company, given the borrower’s 
apparent creditworthiness. In seeking to evaluate a borrower’s creditworthiness for purposes 
of this test, tax authorities have often made reference to the ratio between the principal 
amount of debt to which the borrower is subject, and the value of its assets – that is, to the 
borrower’s debt-to-equity ratio. In practice, however, determining a company’s 
creditworthiness by reference to its debt-to-equity ratio is a highly subjective endeavour. 
Also, multinational groups can increase particular subsidiaries’ levels of equity, and thereby 
manipulate their debt-to-equity ratios, through contributions of cash and other liquid assets. 
For these reasons, in practice tax authorities have not been able to control taxpayers’ 
related-party interest deductions by reference to the traditional test of apparent 
creditworthiness.18 
 
                                                 
17  Tax avoidance strategies involving the use of related-party debt by multinational groups are discussed in detail in OECD 
(2015b). For a recent comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Fleming et al. (2015). 
18  In some situations, notwithstanding the difficulties of using the debt-to-equity ratio as the basis for limitations on interest 
deductions, use of the ratio might be effective if coupled with controls on the taxpayer’s injection of additional equity 
financing - see footnote 19. 
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Recently the OECD, recognising the large role that related-party debt has played in 
corporate tax avoidance around the world, as well as the inadequacy in practice of the 
traditional creditworthiness test, has recommended that countries follow the lead of Germany 
and some other countries that have adopted certain ‘bright-line’ restrictions on the deduction 
of interest by members of multinational groups.19 These rules generally limit deductible 
interest to a specified percentage of the company’s earnings before the payment of interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). German-style interest limitations could 
substantially reduce today’s large incidence of tax avoidance through the use of finance 
companies established in tax havens in all industries, including the extractive industry. 
 
However, for reasons of tax competition that are discussed in Section 2.3, relatively few 
countries around the world – and very few, if any, of the poorer developing countries – have 
adopted limitations on interest deductions following the German model. Therefore most 
countries, especially in the developing world, rely only on the long-discredited debt-to-equity 
ratio approach in seeking to control tax avoidance through the use of related-party debt. The 
practical result in those countries is that members of multinational groups, including 
companies engaged in the extraction of a country’s non-renewable resources, are permitted 
to reduce their taxable income at will through the use of related-party debt. 
 
1.5 Aggregate revenue losses from profit shifting to tax havens 
 
With currently available data, it is not possible to estimate the amount of tax that 
multinational groups avoid each year through the shifting of profits to tax havens, using the 
three basic kinds of avoidance transactions just outlined. It is clear, however, that the volume 
of tax avoidance is economically significant among countries at all levels of economic 
development, and that the consequences of the revenue losses are especially serious in 
developing countries.20 Not only do developing countries depend more heavily on corporate 
tax revenue than wealthier countries, but they are also likely to be especially prone to the 
pressures of tax competition that inhibit governments from interfering with companies’ tax 
avoidance practices. 
 
There also can be no question that much of today’s tax avoidance through profit shifting to 
tax havens occurs in the natural resource sector.21 Because a high proportion of first sales of 
oil and gas, and of hard minerals, are made from the mine or well to captive marketing 
subsidiaries established in tax havens, opportunities for tax avoidance through the 
undervaluation of extractive product are extremely important in natural resource tax 
administration. Similarly, the use of technical services, supplies and equipment purchased 
from related parties is very prominent in extractive operations, and extractive companies are 
often heavily leveraged with related-party debt.  
                                                 
19 OECD (2015b).   
20  The OECD (2015a: 4) says the following: 
Although measuring the scope of BEPS [base erosion and profit shifting] proves challenging, the findings of the work 
performed since 2013 confirm the potential magnitude of the issue, with estimates indicating that the global corporate 
income tax (CIT) revenue losses could be between 4% to 10% of global CIT revenues, i.e. USD 100 to 240 billion 
annually. The losses arise from a variety of causes, including aggressive tax planning by some multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), the interaction of domestic tax rules, lack of transparency and coordination between tax 
administrations, limited country enforcement resources and harmful tax practices. The affiliates of MNEs in low tax 
countries report almost twice the profit rate (relative to assets) of their global group, showing how BEPS can cause 
economic distortions. Estimates of the impact of BEPS on developing countries, as a percentage of tax revenues, are 
higher than in developed countries given developing countries’ greater reliance on CIT revenues. In a globalised 
economy, governments need to cooperate and refrain from harmful tax practices, to address tax avoidance 
effectively, and provide a more certain international environment to attract and sustain investment. Failure to achieve 
such cooperation would reduce the effectiveness of CIT as a tool for resource mobilisation, which would have a 
disproportionately harmful impact on developing countries. 
See also International Monetary Fund (2014) (noting special vulnerability of developing countries to revenue losses from 
base erosion and profit shifting). 
21  Beer and Loeprick (2015) estimate that, globally, profit shifting of various kinds reduces the income tax base of the oil 
and gas sector by between 12% and 35%, and that non-OECD countries generally appear to be more vulnerable to 
profit shifting than OECD member countries. 
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2  Political consequences of the shift towards 
reliance on income-based taxes 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In three ways, greater reliance on income-based taxation has amplified the political 
challenges facing efforts to remedy problems of tax administration in the natural resource 
sector. First, natural resource fiscal regimes have become increasingly vulnerable to the 
political consequences of longstanding ambivalence among some academics and 
policymakers towards the wisdom of corporate income taxation as a general matter. This 
ambivalence has very likely contributed to a lack of political enthusiasm among fiscal 
policymakers in a number of countries for measures that might reduce the global incidence of 
corporate tax avoidance. Second, greater reliance on income-based taxes has rendered 
natural resource taxation more susceptible to the effects of international tax competition. 
Third, the shift in political imagery associated with revenue-raising in the extractive sector – 
away from that of government acting in its proprietary capacity and towards that of 
government acting pursuant to its taxing power – has subjected natural resource taxation 
increasingly to procedural regimes that have evolved over many years in response to a 
perceived need to curtail government’s administrative effectiveness in the exercise of its 
taxing powers. 
 
2.2 Doubts about the advisability of corporate income taxation per se 
 
Influential academics and policymakers have for many years disagreed about the desirability 
of corporate income taxation as an instrument for raising public revenue.22 On one hand, 
despite its vulnerability to profit shifting and base erosion, corporate taxation continues to 
generate revenue that governments would have great difficulty replacing. This consideration 
is seen as particularly important for developing countries, for whom corporate taxes tend to 
supply an especially large percentage of total government revenue.23 Proponents of 
corporate taxation also argue that, as much of the burden of corporate tax appears to fall on 
owners of capital, corporate taxation adds progressivity to tax systems. Opponents argue, 
however, that corporate income taxes, which are imposed directly on profits derived from 
corporate investment, tend more intensively than other taxes to discourage investment and 
thereby suppress global economic growth. It is argued further that considerations of tax 
competition impose severe constraints on governments’ ability to levy corporate taxation 
successfully, particularly in the international setting. Opponents also question the extent to 
which the incidence of corporate income tax is in reality progressive, arguing that the 
economic consequences of corporate income taxation adversely affect workers and 
consumers as well as corporate shareholders. 
 
Political and intellectual disagreement concerning the substantive merits of corporate income 
taxation has almost certainly contributed to political resistance to reforms that would increase 
revenue yields from corporate taxation, including proposals that would curtail the use of tax 
avoidance techniques like those described above. The criticism of corporate income taxation 
has also probably resulted in a certain amount of ambivalence towards procedural measures 
that would enhance the administration and enforcement of corporate tax laws. In view, 
however, of the special role of natural resource taxation in ensuring fair compensation for the 
alienation of a country’s non-renewable resources, ambivalence towards the value of 
corporate income taxation generally should not be permitted to impede the enforcement of 
                                                 
22  For framing of this debate, compare Avi-Yonah (2004) and Brauner (2008). 
23  See footnote 20. 
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corporate income taxes when included as part of a country’s fiscal regime for natural 
resources. 
 
2.3 Tax competition 
 
Another important source of political ambivalence towards the reform of corporate income 
taxation has been the phenomenon of tax competition.24 Governments of countries at all 
levels of economic development see themselves as competitors for inbound investment by 
multinationals, and in response feel compelled to offer investing companies full or partial 
relief from taxation. To some extent, governments provide this relief through explicit tax 
exemptions, often in the form of tax holidays for companies willing to make new business 
investments within a country. Explicit tax exemptions like tax holidays, however, can invite 
political criticism, so that often governments provide effective relief less transparently by 
tolerating, and even tacitly encouraging, rules and practices that leave corporate taxes 
heavily exposed to taxpayer avoidance. 
 
In view of the large economic rents that natural resource deposits can offer potential 
investors, it might be thought that the effects of tax competition would be muted in the 
extractive sector. Few, if any, natural resource discoveries, however, are so economically 
compelling as to transcend entirely the forces of tax competition. Typically, with respect to 
any particular commodity at any point in time, companies face a choice of more or less 
inviting extractive opportunities in which to invest in different countries. The choice among 
these opportunities can be influenced by differences in the fiscal terms that are offered, and 
governments often feel strongly beholden to the forces of tax competition even in the field of 
natural resources.25 
 
The influence of tax competition is not limited only to income-based taxes. Instead, one 
would expect tax competition to reduce governmental willingness to enforce all fiscal 
instruments as they apply to inbound investors, including royalties. However, because 
revenue from income-based levies is much more vulnerable than royalties to erosion by profit 
shifting techniques, governmental acquiescence in porous tax laws and procedures is likely 
to have more serious adverse effects on revenue yields from income-based fiscal 
instruments than from royalties.  
 
2.4 Political imagery and the institution of taxpayer self-assessment 
 
As natural resource fiscal regimes have moved away from their historical emphasis on 
royalties and towards greater reliance on income-based taxation, the image of government 
as the proprietary seller of resources on behalf of the public has faded, and the image of 
government acting to exercise its taxing powers has gained prominence.26 This change in 
imagery is likely to have contributed to increasing toleration of substantive and procedural 
rules that impair the effectiveness of tax administration, and particularly enforcement, in the 
natural resource sector. 
 
                                                 
24  For an important and comprehensive analysis of the political, ethical and economic consequences of tax competition, 
see Avi-Yonah (2000). For a recent discussion of tax competition focusing on effects in developing countries, see Durst 
(2016). 
25  See generally Boadway and Keen (2010: 60 ff). Mansour and Swistak (2017) offer an analysis suggesting that 
extractive industry taxation may be affected less by competitive pressures than taxation in other sectors. This may 
suggest that governments of resource-rich countries often have sufficient market power to resist competitive pressures -
- although the authors warn that their analysis should be considered preliminary. 
26  International Senior Lawyers Project et al. (2013: 73) encapsulates the traditional imagery of royalties:  
The theory behind a royalty is that it is a payment to the state for the mineral resources owned by the state on behalf 
of the people. A royalty is not, strictly speaking, a ‘tax.’ It is an exchange for the right to mine. Therefore, royalty 
provisions are often found in a state’s mining law rather than in its tax law. 
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When a government is seen as the proprietary seller of its country’s resources, the 
behavioural norms most naturally appropriate to the government are those of the 
marketplace – norms under which sellers are expected to act assertively in proposing asking 
prices in transactions, and buyer and seller generally are entitled to procedural parity in 
negotiations. When government is seen as acting pursuant to its taxing powers, however, a 
different imagery naturally applies. Acting in its taxing capacity, government is viewed as 
inherently prone to overreaching, and is seen as properly subject to substantive and 
procedural restraints exceeding those that are appropriate to sellers of goods in the 
marketplace. 
 
Logically, the shift towards greater reliance on income-based taxation does not change the 
underlying substance of governmental revenue-raising in the extractive sector. That is, if the 
government was motivated by proprietary concerns under royalty regimes, it logically 
remains so motivated under fiscal regimes relying more heavily on income taxes. Moreover, 
the economic effects of a levy are the same whether the levy is seen as motivated by 
governmental proprietary interests or by the government’s power to tax. Boadway and Keen 
point out that: ‘From the perspective of the investor … it makes little difference whether a 
payment is called a royalty or a tax: the economic impact is the same. In terms of policy 
design too, whether one thinks of a royalty as akin to a user fee or as an explicit tax, the 
determination of its proper level and time path reduces to the same question in optimal 
pricing’ (Boadway and Keen 2010: 27-28).27 Therefore, as a matter of logic alone, the move 
towards greater reliance on income-based levies should not shift political attitudes towards 
revenue-raising in the natural resource sphere.28 
 
Nevertheless, imagery is a powerful force. As a practical matter, the greater prominence of 
income-based taxation has subjected natural resource fiscal regimes more heavily to 
substantive rules and procedural traditions that seriously constrain government’s ability to 
enforce revenue-raising instruments effectively. Whereas the constraints might, at least 
arguably, reflect an appropriate balance between the interests of governments and taxpayers 
in many circumstances, they seem unduly restrictive when government seeks to operate in 
its role as seller of a country’s non-renewable resources. 
 
Constraints against governmental overreaching in the exercise of its taxing powers are built 
deeply into the structure of income tax procedures. At the heart of income tax procedures in 
many countries is the principle of self-assessment – that is, a taxpayer takes the first step in 
assessing their tax obligations by reporting to the government, on a self-declaration, the 
taxpayer’s own estimation of their proper tax liability. When taxpayers are faced with 
uncertainty in the estimation of their proper liabilities, there is a long-established legal 
tradition to the effect that in making their self-declaration taxpayers are permitted to resolve 
the uncertainties in their favour, so long as their position falls within the range of possible 
outcomes that a court might plausibly be expected to reach if the position becomes subject to 
legal controversy.29 
                                                 
27  It might be argued to the contrary that where extractive companies are subject to a country’s generally applicable 
corporate income tax as well as to other levies that are applied only to resource extraction, the corporate income tax 
should be evaluated for policy purposes separately from the other components of the fiscal regime – and particularly 
that the corporate income tax component of the fiscal regime should be evaluated by reference to whether the corporate 
income tax, as applied to resource companies, is similar in incidence and other effects to the corporate income tax as it 
is applied in the economy generally - see Mintz and Chen (2012). Against this, however, the social welfare implications 
of government’s proprietary role in natural resource taxation arguably are sufficiently compelling to justify greater 
deference to governmental interests in the natural resource setting than in the field of corporate income taxation 
generally.  
28  The fact that even a levy labelled as a corporate income tax (or resource rent tax) serves the practical purpose of 
compensation for the alienation of resources points to the need for ring fencing income-based taxes, so that only 
expenses and losses incurred in the course of a particular extractive project can be used to offset gross income from 
that project. See generally Calder (2017: 82-83). In practice, ring fencing always plays a large role in the design of fiscal 
systems for natural resource extraction.  
29  For discussion of the roots of this tradition, see Durst (1987). 
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After a taxpayer has submitted their self-declaration, it is then up to the tax administration to 
audit it and to challenge positions that the tax administration believes may be unduly 
favourable to the taxpayer. The taxpayer then has the opportunity to protest the tax 
administration’s findings on audit, first typically through an administrative appeals process 
and then, if the matter remains unresolved, in the courts. The principle of permitting 
taxpayers to resolve bona fide uncertainties to their advantage on their tax declaration is 
unavoidable under self-assessment tax regimes. To require taxpayers to resolve 
uncertainties against their own interests would subject taxpayers to pressure, in essence, 
akin to that of self-incrimination, and would be seen as representing an undue imposition of 
governmental power over actors in the private sector. 
 
Procedural deference to taxpayers is not limited to the process of filing the taxpayer’s self-
declaration, but extends as well to the resolution of tax disputes. Technically, under the 
procedural laws in place generally in countries around the world, once a tax authority has 
asserted an adjustment in the course of an audit, the adjustment is presumed correct unless 
the taxpayer can refute it by a preponderance of the available evidence. As a practical 
matter, however, judges, wary of the possibility of governmental overreaching, tend to hold 
tax authorities to high standards of clarity and persuasiveness in their arguments for 
adjustments to taxpayer positions. Historically, this tendency has posed serious challenges 
to tax authorities in disputes involving questions that involve the exercise of subjective 
judgement, including questions of valuation.30 This is true especially in cases involving large 
amounts of potential tax liability, in which judges typically are presented with conflicting 
analyses from expert witnesses hired by both taxpayers and the government. Judges often 
are left with the impression that the government is acting unreasonably, and those cases that 
come to court are usually decided (to the frequent frustration of government counsel) heavily 
in the taxpayer’s favour (Avi-Yonah 2007; Durst and Culbertson 2003).31  
 
Tax authorities, in short, are at a serious procedural disadvantage in seeking to challenge 
taxpayers’ valuations of items of income and expense, and knowledge of this disadvantage 
has for many years affected tax enforcement practices around the world. Tax authorities 
typically are willing to devote enforcement resources only to taxpayer valuations that appear 
grossly biased against the taxpayer. Positions that appear less egregious are either passed 
over during audits or are resolved in an essentially ritualistic matter in the course of 
administrative appeals, often on the basis of relatively minor concessions by the taxpayer.32 
 
 
3  Possible responses to the vulnerabilities of 
income-based levies in the extractive sector 
 
3.1 Adjusting the mix between royalties and income-based taxation  
 
Although greater reliance on income-based levies has imported serious problems into the 
administration and enforcement of natural resource taxation, income-based levies also offer 
important economic efficiencies,33 and reversing the trend towards greater reliance on 
                                                 
30  The difficulties faced by tax authorities in pursuing controversies involving related-party pricing are described in United 
States General Accounting Office (1995), and in numerous judicial opinions that are analysed in Avi-Yonah (2007). See 
also Durst and Culbertson (2003). 
31  Two recent US judicial opinions in which this tendency is indicated rather clearly are Veritas v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 
297 (2009), and Medtronic v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2016-112 (9 June 2016). 
32  Administrative appeals processes around the world typically are shielded from public disclosure by taxpayer 
confidentiality rules. Therefore, there is little transparency in the manner in which issues of valuation, even very large 
ones, are resolved in practice. 
33  See footnote 4. 
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income-based taxation should be approached with caution. Most importantly, whereas under 
a royalty the investor faces the prospect of taxation before the costs of an investment have 
been recovered, taxation under an income tax begins only after the investment has become 
profitable – and, under a resource rent tax, only after the investor has not only recovered 
their costs, but has also achieved at least a minimal return on their overall investment. By 
mitigating investor risks, income-based taxes generally should lower the costs to countries of 
attracting extractive industry investment. The cost to low-income countries of forgoing this 
advantage, by eschewing the use of income-based levies in their fiscal regimes for natural 
resources, would appear high. 
 
Nevertheless, it does not seem rational to achieve the economic efficiencies of income-
based taxation at the cost of revenue shortfalls that, to a serious extent, deprive a country of 
fair compensation for the removal of its non-renewable resources. Therefore, despite the 
political and technical challenges of doing so, the task of improving the performance of 
income-based levies in the natural resource sector should be seen as both urgent and 
essential. 
 
As a temporary measure, until effective substantive and procedural reforms can be 
implemented, countries might wish, at least to some extent, to defer expansion of the use of 
income-based taxes in their natural resource fiscal regimes. In particular, it might be possible 
as an interim measure to make greater use of various kinds of progressive royalties. The rate 
of a progressive royalty adjusts with changes with product prices, production volumes or 
both, so that the rate of the royalty generally will adjust, albeit roughly, in correlation with the 
extractive company’s net income. Progressive royalties, therefore, provide some of the risk-
mitigating features of income-based taxes, but do not require the actual measurement of net 
income, so they are much less vulnerable than income-based taxes to revenue erosion 
through profit shifting strategies.34 
 
Even the most creatively designed progressive royalties may afford investors significantly 
less protection against risk than income-based taxes, so progressive royalties may not be 
appropriate as a substitute for income-based taxes in the long term. Their more widespread 
use, however, would be sensible, at least until the vulnerabilities of income-based 
instruments can be successfully addressed.  
 
3.2 The administrative pricing model in natural resource revenue 
administration 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
An alternative to self-assessment, as a means of handling the valuation issues that arise 
under income-based taxation, is an administrative pricing approach.35 Under an 
administrative pricing regime the tax authority, rather than the taxpayer, initially provides a 
valuation with respect to an item of income or expense. The taxpayer typically has the 
opportunity to consult with the tax authority with respect to the valuation, but the government, 
as first mover in setting forth an arm’s-length price, obtains what amounts to a substantial 
presumptive advantage – it is the taxpayer that must demonstrate that the government’s 
price determinations fall outside a reasonable range of correctness, rather than the reverse. 
                                                 
34  Guj et al. (2013: 13-16) and Boadway and Keen (2010: 29-30) enumerate various ways in which royalties can be 
structured. Clausing and Durst (2015) find a strong correlation between oil and gas price levels and the profitability of 
extractive companies, suggesting that a price-based royalty might to some extent approximate the economic results of 
an income tax from the standpoint of a natural resource investor. 
35  See Guj et al. (2013: 54) and Calder (2010: 348). Calder writes: 
Pricing may also be carried out as a separate process from audit. It is a process by which tax authorities determine in 
advance what prices companies must use for valuing their production when calculating their taxes. This advance 
pricing procedure is adopted because of the prevalence of transfer pricing risks and other pricing risks in the resource 
industry … Pricing of production is clearly crucial, and presents significant risks. 
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The taxpayer is afforded the opportunity to appeal valuations with which it disagrees; appeal 
processes typically rely on arbitration using expert panels. 
 
The discussion below describes an administrative pricing system that Norway has had in 
place for the valuation of its North Sea crude oil, and which several other countries have 
incorporated in their regimes for petroleum taxation. The discussion then considers means 
by which the principles of administrative pricing might be extended to: (i) the valuation of 
commodities that are more difficult to appraise than crude oil, including metal ores; (ii) the 
determination of permissible deductions for related-party expenses of various kinds; and (iii) 
the limitation of interest deductions.  
 
3.2.2 The Norwegian system 
 
When large oil deposits were proven under Norway’s waters at the end of the 1960s, the 
country faced several circumstances that were conducive to effective revenue administration. 
The newly-found deposits were large and potentially very profitable, thus providing some 
degree of insulation from international tax competition. There was a strong political 
commitment to ensuring that the public obtained a fair share of proceeds from exploitation of 
the North Sea fields. Finally, tax avoidance practices involving the use of tax havens in 
connection with related-party transactions were less globally pervasive than they are today, 
so multinational companies may have perceived less of a political stake in the status quo 
with respect to the rules governing valuation for tax purposes. 
 
The result was the establishment in 1976 of a system of ‘norm prices’ for petroleum, under 
the jurisdiction of a Petroleum Price Board (PPB), an independent expert body that is housed 
within the Petroleum and Energy Ministry and includes members from that ministry and the 
Finance Ministry.36 On a quarterly basis, for each North Sea field the PPB establishes 
provisional daily prices for oil that will be lifted from the field during the forthcoming three 
months. At the inception of each three-month period, the companies concerned are invited to 
offer submissions setting forth their views of the appropriate daily price levels, but there is no 
explicitly adversarial process for setting the prices. The norm prices apply, for tax purposes,37 
to both related-party sales as well as to any third-party sales that might be made from the 
fields; this coverage relieves the government of the need to verify the actual independence of 
transactions that are presented by the taxpayer as occurring between unrelated parties. At 
the end of the quarter, the PPB adjusts the provisional prices and issues final daily prices for 
use in tax reporting with respect to each field. Companies can appeal the PPB’s price 
determinations to an appellate board sitting within the Ministry of Finance, and further appeal 
may be had to the courts. In practice, controversy over the PPB’s pricing decisions reportedly 
has been limited, and the Norwegian pricing system appears now to have operated 
effectively for about forty years. The PPB’s quarterly price determinations for each North Sea 
field are routinely made available to the public. 
 
                                                 
36  Regulations governing the Norwegian pricing system are available at <www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Regulations/Norm-
price-fixing/>. Brief histories of the system are available at <www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/energy/oil-and-
gas/petroleum-price-board-and-the-norm-price/id661559> and 
<www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways=petroleum-history/>. An extended description of the Norwegian 
system is found in a United States Tax Court opinion, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 256 (1995) 
(court holds that Norwegian taxes are eligible for US foreign income tax credits notwithstanding administrative manner 
in which oil prices are determined). 
When, as under the Norwegian system, administrative pricing regimes apply to income taxes as opposed to royalties, 
the pricing regime might be subject to legal challenge under bilateral income tax treaties, which generally require 
countries to follow arm’s-length transfer pricing methods (and which do not apply to royalties) (Calder 2017: 80). So long 
as an administrative pricing regime represents a good-faith effort to estimate market prices, however, the success of a 
legal challenge based on tax treaties would seem unlikely. 
37  Norway depends primarily on income-based taxes in its fiscal regime for petroleum, and does not impose a royalty. See 
generally Deloitte, Oil and Gas Taxation in Norway, 
<http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-oil-and-gas-taxguide-
norway.pdf>. 
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The organising principle of the Norwegian system is that, in setting the quarterly norm prices, 
the government in effect resolves all of the uncertainties that must be addressed in 
estimating a market price, including uncertainties as to the effects on market price of 
variations in product quality, transport costs and contract duration.38 None of these 
parameters is left open to determination through taxpayer self-reporting. This comprehensive 
coverage of all materially relevant variables is essential because, as illustrated above, 
uncertainty with respect to even a single variable could generate large revenue losses, given 
the intrinsic vulnerabilities of income-based taxation. 
 
A number of developing countries have adopted systems of prescribed petroleum pricing for 
tax and royalty purposes, that are based in some manner on available posted prices. These 
include Indonesia,39 Nigeria,40 Angola,41 Mauritania42 and Afghanistan.43 In view of the 
apparent promise of the administrative pricing model in addressing difficult questions of 
valuation under income-based taxation, comprehensive research concerning the 
effectiveness of the approach in practice would be valuable. Research should aim at the 
compilation of as complete a catalogue as possible of existing administrative pricing regimes 
in producing countries at all levels of economic development, 44 and should compare the 
details of each country’s regime, particularly the extent to which taxpayers are permitted on 
their own initiative to made adjustments to posted prices for factors like product quality 
differentials, transportation costs and contract duration. In addition, to the extent feasible 
under countries’ transparency policies and other factors affecting the availability of data, 
research should include in-depth studies of the operation of different administrative pricing 
regimes in practice, including the extent of taxpayer compliance, the frequency of disputes, 
and the extent to which disputes are satisfactorily resolved. 
 
3.3 Administrative pricing for products other than crude oil 
 
Crude oil, in part because of its relative uniformity in physical composition, is more 
susceptible to an administrative pricing regime than other natural resource products. Other 
products, including hard mineral ores and even natural gas, are generally harder to value in 
part because of their wide range of physical variability.45 Hard minerals extraction, however, 
is of crucial importance to the economies of many countries, including some of the world’s 
poorest developing countries, and the need for successful techniques of administrative 
pricing for hard minerals is urgent. 
 
                                                 
38  For purposes of addressing the variable of contract duration, the pricing board seeks to determine average contractual 
terms as found in the marketplace for product of a particular kind. See Phillips Petroleum v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. at 
265. 
39  See PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016: 55) and Sunley et al. (2002: 25). 
40  The Nigerian national oil company maintains a system of reference prices based on a basket of posted prices along with 
quality differentials. The extent to which the pricing system applies for tax and royalty purposes (in addition to the pricing 
of product sold by the national oil company) is unclear. See Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2013: 
34-38, 177-181, 184-187). 
41  Angolan Law on Taxation of Petroleum Activities (December 2004). An unofficial translation of the law is available at 
<http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/attachments/fiscal-design/Angola%20-
%20Petroleum%20Taxation%20Law%202004.pdf>; excerpts are provided in Appendix A. 
42  The Mauritanian pricing rules are incorporated in contracts for several exploration and production blocs in Mauritania 
developed by Kosmos Energy. Copies of the contracts are available through the website of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, <beta.eiti.org>, and on a website that Kosmos Energy maintains for purposes of transparency, 
<http://www.kosmosenergy.com/responsibility/transparency.php>. A copy of the pricing provisions from the contract for 
Bloc C8 is provided below as Appendix B. 
43  Amu Darya Basin Oil Tender of 2011, Ministry of Mines, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, available through Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative Website, <beta.eiti.org>. The pricing formula contained in the contract is provided 
below as Appendix C. 
44  According to Sunley et al. (2002: 3 n.4), some countries’ fiscal regimes employed government-determined market prices 
prior to the 1970s but these fell into disuse; the establishment of the Norwegian system represented a reversal of a 
trend away from administrative pricing. Historical research on this topic would be useful. 
45  See e.g. Sunley and Baunsgaard (2001: 14-15) and Calder (2017: 93). 
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Effective administrative pricing regimes for hard minerals are likely to require continuous on-
site inspection and appraisal by assayers or other technical experts employed, or hired on a 
contract basis, by the tax administration. Government appraisers of extracted product are 
already used within the hard minerals sector,46 but useful documentation of different 
countries’ experiences seems difficult to locate. This, too, is an area in which detailed 
country-specific research could be very helpful. 
 
An approach related to, but not as ambitious as, fully-fledged administrative pricing is a 
formulaic approach to product valuation similar to that which has been used pursuant to 
contract by Afghanistan for pricing crude oil, which may be suited for the valuation of some 
kinds of hard minerals.47 Coefficients within a formula might specify the extent to which the 
posted price for an ore will be adjusted for variations in the physical characteristics of 
extracted product (for example, by specifying percentage adjustments to posted prices for 
variations in the concentration of metal, or of specified impurities, within the ore), or for 
differences in transport costs for particular shipments of ore. The coefficients of the formula 
might be adjusted only at defined intervals (for example, annually), in contrast to the 
continuous reassessment of factors affecting product price under a comprehensive 
administrative pricing system. 
 
Formulas impose less extensive administrative demands than full-scale administrative pricing 
regimes, and their use is tempting. Commodities markets, however, tend to be both volatile 
and complex, and the extent to which particular factors of valuation affect the overall product 
price can change quickly. The financial significance of particular variations in product quality, 
for example, can shift rapidly as changes in supply and demand alter the relationship 
between prices of metals of different grade. Also, changes in industry practices as to the 
duration of the typical sales contract can quickly cause a pricing formula based on fixed 
coefficients to generate anomalous results. 
 
Fixed formulas might be especially viable in connection with the valuation of high-value 
commodities like precious metals, because the various adjustments needed to translate 
posted prices into market valuations are likely to be smaller compared to the intrinsic value of 
the product. For these products, a formula based on posted prices, and assays of the metal 
content of each shipment of ore, might provide a stable basis on which to value the extracted 
product for tax purposes. 
 
Again, detailed country-specific research on different countries’ practices for hard minerals 
valuation is needed. In general, progress towards transparency has been slower with respect 
to hard minerals than oil and gas extraction, and comprehensive research will pose 
especially difficult challenges. In view of the importance of hard minerals extraction to many 
countries’ hopes for economic development, however, the need for comprehensive research 
is compelling. 
 
3.4 Dispute resolution under administrative pricing regimes 
 
In order to prevent an administrative pricing regime from degenerating into an unending 
stream of administrative and judicial controversy, streamlined procedures should be provided 
for the resolution of disputes. For this purpose, the approach of ‘baseball arbitration’, of the 
kind that has been employed in recent years by the United States and Canada for resolving 
                                                 
46  Guj et al. (2013: 36) describe, for example, the use of government valuation specialists in connection with the appraisal 
of extracted diamonds in Western Australia and in Canada. 
47  See footnote 43 and Appendix C. Indonesia has employed a formula pricing approach to oil for a number of years, 
based on posted benchmark prices - see PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016: 55) and Sunley et al. (2002: 25). Research 
would be useful to evaluate how the Indonesian pricing formula has performed in practice, including the extent to which 
the formula has accommodated adjustments to posted prices for items like transportation and quality differentials.  
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bilateral transfer pricing disputes,48 might offer promise. Under baseball arbitration both 
parties submit to the arbitrators their own estimates of the proper price, and the arbitrators 
are constrained to accept what they find to be the more nearly correct of the two proposals 
that have been submitted. Baseball arbitration guards against the pursuit of unreasonable 
positions by either party, and would appear well-suited to the resolution of disputes 
concerning natural resource pricing. 
 
3.5 Extending the administrative pricing model to related-party expenses 
 
The administrative pricing model cannot be extended in its entirety to the determination of 
permissible levels of deduction for services and property purchased from related parties, 
because the proper level of deductions will always depend on facts unique to the particular 
taxpayer. Therefore, deductions for related-party expenses will need to remain subject, at 
least to some extent, to self-reporting by the taxpayer and after-the-fact audit by the tax 
administration. Nevertheless, it may be possible to achieve substantially improved revenue 
results through rules that afford definitive answers to some of the legal uncertainties that 
currently prevent effective tax administration with respect to related-party expenses. 
 
Especially in recent decades, taxpayers have come to depend heavily on these uncertainties 
for large amounts of corporate tax avoidance, and as a political matter it might be difficult to 
prescribe rules for resolving them for application in all industry settings. In view, however, of 
the special role of natural resource fiscal regimes in ensuring governments fair consideration 
for the alienation of their non-renewable resource endowments, it might be possible to 
establish these rules specifically for use in natural resource taxation. Countries might 
accomplish this either through statutes that apply only to income-based taxation in the 
extractive industry setting, or by incorporating the rules in concession agreements or other 
contracts governing resource extraction. 
 
In particular, countries might adopt the following principles for application in extractive 
industry taxation: 
 
 Disallow deduction of profits accruing to tax haven hubs. A key question is whether 
extractive companies should be permitted to deduct only reimbursements of a provider’s 
actual fully-absorbed costs of providing technical, management and other services, or 
whether the extractive company should be permitted in addition to deduct a markup 
(profit element) on the service-provider’s costs. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
generally allow for the deduction of a profit element, but that creates a large risk of the 
diversion of profits to tax haven hub companies.49 A rule disallowing the deduction of 
markups in all circumstances would probably be seen as politically unacceptable, even if 
applicable only to taxation in the extractive sector. 50 A perhaps more promising 
alternative for use in the extractive sector is generally to allow the deduction of markups 
at levels that are consistent with the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
                                                 
48  See United States Internal Revenue Service, Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, available at 
<https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2010_-_arbitration_-_board_operating_guidelines_nov_8-10_final.pdf>. 
49  See footnote 11 and accompanying text. 
50 Arguably, under income taxation blanket prohibitions of the deduction of markups on service cost would be subject to 
challenge as violating the requirement, under income tax treaties, that governments apply arm’s-length transfer pricing 
methods; cf. Calder (2017: 80). Income tax treaties do not, however, apply to the terms of production sharing contracts 
between national oil companies and private extractive companies, and prohibition of the deduction of markups can be 
found in these agreements (Calder 2017: 99); see e.g. Timor-Leste Model Production Sharing Contract, paragraph 
3.4(b)(ii), available at <http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetRegime/PSC%20model%20270805.pdf>. 
Although governments probably do not have as much legal latitude as they do under production sharing contracts to 
depart from arm’s length practices with respect to the limitation of companies’ expense deductions, production sharing 
contracts nevertheless can offer useful guidance for the drafting of effective limitations on deductions under income-
based tax rules. While production sharing contracts are much more common with respect to oil and gas than hard 
minerals, current practices under production sharing contracts may be instructive in designing limitations on deductible 
expenses in the hard minerals sector. 
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but only if the taxpayer certifies that none of the amounts deducted inure directly or 
indirectly to legal entities that do not physically perform the services that are provided. 
This approach should generally preclude profit shifting through the use of tax hub 
companies established in tax havens. 
 Hedging and related-party insurance. No deduction should be allowed for hedging 
services or for factoring services provided by any party, whether or not related to the 
taxpayer.51 No deduction should be allowed for insurance services provided directly or 
indirectly by a related party. Deduction for insurance services provided by an unrelated 
party shall be allowed only at cost (that is, on a pass-through basis without markup if the 
services are procured through the intermediation of a related party). 
 Acquisition of equipment and supplies from related parties. Amounts paid for new (that is, 
not previously used) items sold or leased to an extractive company from a related party 
should be deductible (or capitalisable, if appropriate) at the price indicated on a purchase 
receipt from the party from which the property was originally procured. That is, no markup 
on the original cost of the items should be deductible by the extractive company that 
receives the property. Deduction of the costs of previously-used items, like used vehicles 
and mining equipment, generally should be permitted only on the basis of a valuation by 
a qualified independent appraiser.52 
 Intangible property. No deduction should be allowed for amounts paid to a related party 
for the use of intangible property in extractive operations, except that the costs of 
intangible property procured by a related party from an unrelated party, and then made 
available for use by the taxpayer, may be deducted to the extent of the actual cost of the 
intangible property, without markup. This rule is necessary because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing bona fide licences of intangible property, like proprietary know-how, from 
the provision of services by expert personnel within multinational groups. Allowance of 
deductions for items like a group’s accumulated technological know-how would permit 
easy avoidance of rules limiting the deduction of markups on the cost of intragroup 
services, and could facilitate avoidance through the use of tax haven hub companies. 
  
3.6 Interest deductions 
 
Developing countries should, as a general matter, adopt recent recommendations of the 
OECD and limit taxpayers’ related-party interest deductions under the corporate income tax 
to a ceiling of 10 to 30 per cent of the taxpayer’s EBITDA.53 Ideally, legislation should apply 
these rules to corporate taxpayers in all industries. That may meet substantial political 
opposition, however, and it may be more feasible for governments to apply limitations on 
interest deductions specially with respect to income from extractive industry projects. This 
might be accomplished either through statutes that apply specifically to extractive industry 
                                                 
51  If a member of a multinational group conducts bona fide hedging operations within a country, it might be appropriate 
under arm’s-length principles to allow deduction of costs related to the hedging within that country – but the hedging 
activities should be considered an activity separate from any extractive operations that might be conducted within the 
country and the hedging should be ring-fenced, for purposes of taxation, from the extractive activities - e.g. Guj et al. 
(2013: 56-57); International Monetary Fund (2012: 45).  
52  If an extractive company purchases property that has been manufactured or constructed by another member of the 
company’s multinational group, deductions should be limited to the fully absorbed costs of manufacture or construction 
plus an arm’s-length markup, although no deduction should be allowed for amounts inuring to tax haven companies that 
did not manufacture the property (e.g. to tax haven companies that have merely purchased and re-sold the property). 
53  See Calder (2010: 328) and International Monetary Fund (2012: 45) (supporting the use of simplified limitations on 
interest deductions in the natural resource setting). The rules adopted by developing countries should incorporate the 
various technical features recommended by the OECD, including allowance of carryovers of unused deductions, and 
perhaps the allowance of certain exceptions if the taxpayer demonstrates that its multinational group as a whole 
deducts interest, on loans from third parties, at levels in excess of the generally applicable EBITDA limitation - see 
generally OECD (2015b). As a practical matter, statutory limitations on interest deductions generally have been 
accepted around the world as consistent with provisions in income tax treaties calling for arm’s-length transfer pricing 
rules. cf. Fleming et al. (2015: 701-708); OECD (2015b) (discussing potential EU treaty issues arising from interest 
limitations, but not raising concerns under bilateral income tax treaties). 
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income, or by the inclusion of limitations in contracts governing the operation of particular 
projects.54  
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
Over the course of seven decades, natural resource taxation around the world has come to 
rely relatively less on royalties and more on income-based forms of taxation. The shift 
towards income-based taxation has brought with it important economic efficiencies. 
Increased reliance on income-based taxes, however, has rendered natural resource fiscal 
regimes much more vulnerable to tax avoidance based on taxpayer exploitation of difficulties 
in the fair market valuation of items of income and deduction. This kind of tax avoidance, 
which has received widespread public attention in recent years, is common in all industries. 
Tax avoidance in the natural resource industry is especially regrettable, however, as it can 
deprive some of the world’s poorest developing countries of fair compensation for the 
removal of their non-renewable resource endowments. 
 
This paper has suggested that certain principles of administrative pricing, as exemplified by 
procedures that Norway applies in valuing North Sea oil, might be effective in curtailing 
various kinds of tax avoidance in the extractive sector. Designing and implementing effective 
controls on tax avoidance based on the administrative pricing approach will, however, require 
substantial efforts on the part of researchers, policymakers and advocacy organisations in 
the international development community. 
 
First, designing and implementing effective controls on avoidance would be assisted by 
research to identify, evaluate and compare the effectiveness of different countries’ current 
practices in the field of natural resource tax administration. This research should include not 
only the review of statutes, regulations and contracts, but also observation of revenue 
administration processes in the field. Performing this research, and publishing the results in 
usable form, will require a growing commitment on the part of governments to transparency 
with respect to administrative practices affecting natural resources. 
 
Second, the implementation of effective controls on tax avoidance in the extractive sector 
should be supported by political efforts to demonstrate the ethical imperative of ensuring tax 
compliance in the extractive sector. In particular, it will need to be argued effectively that the 
necessity of ensuring countries fair compensation for the alienation of their non-renewable 
resource endowments justifies anti-avoidance measures that might not be seen as politically 
acceptable in other industry settings. 
 
Important research and advocacy in support of improvements to revenue administration in 
the extractive sector are already being provided from a number of sources. Civil society 
organisations have been engaged in documenting the damage to social welfare that arises 
from failure to ensure developing countries with adequate compensation for the removal of 
their non-renewable resources.55 Intergovernmental organisations like the International 
                                                 
54  e.g. Article 14 of the amended concession agreement between the Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel limits the 
concessionaire’s debt-to-equity ratio to 3-to-1. The agreement is available at 
<http://www.leiti.org.lr/uploads/2/1/5/6/21569928/52423536-an-act-ratifying-the-amendment-to-the-mineral-
development-agreement-mda-dated-august-17-2005-between-the-government-of-liberia_and_mittal_steel.pdf>. The 
use of a rule based on the taxpayer’s debt-to-equity ratio generally would be more susceptible of taxpayer manipulation 
than a German-style rule based on a percentage of the taxpayer’s EBITDA – see Section 1.4. If, however, a contract 
includes safeguards against manipulation of the taxpayer’s debt-to-equity ratio by ‘stuffing’ a legal entity with equity 
contributions, then a limitation based on the ratio might be sufficiently reliable. 
55  See e.g. ActionAid UK (2015); International Mining for Development Centre (2014); Readhead (2016a and 2016b) 
(studies for Natural Resource Governance Institute); Open Society Initiative for West Africa (2015); and Hubert (2016) 
(study for Oxfam). In addition, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an organisation comprised of 
companies and industry organisations, governments, intergovernmental organisations and civil society organisations, 
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Monetary Fund, World Bank and OECD, as well as a number of national governments, have 
long been active in seeking to identify effective mechanisms for reform, and in attempting to 
implement them through technical assistance around the world. Continuing efforts of these 
kinds are essential if the people of developing countries, including some of the world’s most 
impoverished, are to receive fair compensation for the removal of their irreplaceable 
endowments of resource wealth.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
has achieved substantial progress in bringing greater transparency to the extractive sector, thereby facilitating the kind 
of country-specific research that will be required to design improved anti-avoidance measures. Background on EITI can 
be found through the organisation’s website, <beta.eiti.org>. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
Excerpts from Republic of Angola, Law on Taxation of Petroleum Activities (2004) 
(English translation by law firm of Miranda, Correia, Amendoeria & Associados) 
 
Article 6.1 
 
1. For the purposes of assessing the taxable income relating to the tax charges referred to in 
this Law, excluding the Surface Fee, the crude oil produced shall be valued at the market 
price calculated on the basis of the actual FOB prices obtained through arm’s length sales to 
third parties in accordance with the rules set forth in the following subparagraphs:  
 
(a) The State Concessionaire and each of its associates shall separately submit to the 
Ministry of Petroleum, at least 15 days prior to the beginning of each quarter, an informative 
report addressing their forecasts for world supply and consumption of petroleum, and their 
estimates of the market prices which can be obtained for the crude oil to be produced in their 
respective concession during the quarter in question;  
 
(b) Within 15 days following the end of each quarter, or by another subsequent date as may 
be determined by the Ministry of Petroleum, the State Concessionaire and each of its 
associates shall separately submit to said Ministry formal reports including the actual prices 
obtained in their respective arm’s length sales to third parties, distinguishing between term 
sales and spot sales. Said reports shall provide a detailed account of sales volumes, buyers, 
prices received, credit terms and density adjustments. They shall also include the actual 
calculations of volumetrically weighted average prices on a comparable basis of density and 
terms of credit. The State Concessionaire and its associates may also provide any further 
market-related informative data they consider relevant to substantiate the veracity of the 
information provided;  
 
(c) The Ministry of Petroleum shall examine the data provided, as well as any other 
trustworthy data which reflect market conditions and which the Ministry considers may be 
useful in determining a suitable market price for the crude oil sold during the quarter in 
question. If necessary, the Ministry can meet separately with the State Concessionaire and 
each of its associates in order to discuss all relevant information which has been provided or 
which is otherwise available. The data provided, as well as any trustworthy additional data 
reflecting market conditions, if the latter exists, shall be the sole criteria used to determine 
market price;  
 
(d) The Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Finance shall analyse the data referred to in 
the preceding subparagraphs and shall jointly determine the market price, which must be 
communicated to the State Concessionaire and its associates within 15 days following the 
presentation of the reports mentioned in subparagraph (b) above;  
 
(e) In the event that neither the State Concessionaire nor its associates have made arm’s 
length sales to third parties during the quarter, the reports of the State Concessionaire and 
its associates shall be limited to the data relevant to market conditions. The aforementioned 
Ministries shall in this case determine the market price using the same method described in 
subparagraph (c) above;  
 
(f) In the event that the State Concessionaire or any of its associates considers that the 
market price determined under the terms of the preceding subparagraphs does not reflect 
relevant market conditions, they may individually or jointly, within 20 days of being notified of 
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the determined market price, request a second separate meeting with the Ministries of 
Petroleum and Finance and submit any additional information which they may consider 
relevant to the matter in question. Within 10 days of having received the aforementioned 
additional information, and having taken said data into consideration, the Ministries of 
Petroleum and Finance shall either revise the determined market price, or shall confirm the 
previously determined market price, providing a duly substantiated explanation;  
 
(g) Should the State Concessionaire or any of its associates consider that the price 
determined by way of the analysis provided for in the preceding subparagraph still does not 
reflect market conditions, the matter may be submitted to an independent expert, to be 
appointed within 15 days, under the terms of subparagraph (i) below;  
 
(h) The expert must prepare and submit a report on the market values for the quarter in 
question. This report shall include the determination of a fair market value for the crude oil 
produced in the area in question, and said determination shall be presented to the Ministries 
of Petroleum and Finance for forwarding to the State Concessionaire and its associates. 
Within 10 days of having received said report, the State Concessionaire and its associates 
shall meet jointly with the Ministries of Petroleum and Finance in order to discuss this new 
information with a view to agreeing upon a mutually acceptable price. In the event they are 
unable to reach such an agreement, the aforementioned ministries, taking into account the 
report of the independent expert, shall either proceed to revise the determined price, or 
confirm the previously determined price, providing a duly substantiated explanation; 
 
(i) The expert shall be an independent and impartial individual or entity, and be appointed by 
agreement between the State Concessionaire and its associates or, in the absence of such 
an agreement, shall be appointed within a period of 20 days by a qualified official of a 
specialised international institution, at the request of the State Concessionaire or any of its 
associates. The terms of reference provided to the expert shall be such as to require him to 
submit his report to the Ministries of Petroleum and Finance within 20 days of receiving the 
matter for consideration. The expert shall take into account all relevant information which 
may be provided to him by the State Concessionaire, by its associates, or by the Ministries of 
Petroleum and Finance, as well as information that he may reasonably request from the 
State Concessionaire or its associates, to be provided to him from their records, or which he 
may obtain from other available trustworthy sources. Any fees and expenses of the 
international institution or the expert shall be borne by whosoever submits the case to the 
latter. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF MAURITANIA AND KOSMOS ENERGY MAURITANIA 
  
  
Bloc C8 
 
(April 5, 2012) 
 
 
ARTICLE 14: PRICE AND MEASUREMENT OF HYDROCARBONS 
  
14.1     The unitary market price of the Crude Petroleum used in consideration for purposes 
of Articles 10 and 11 here above shall be the ‘Market Price’ F.O.B. the Delivery Point, 
expressed in Dollars per Barrel, as determined here below for each Quarter. 
  
A Market Price shall be established for each type of Crude Petroleum or blend of 
Crude Petroleums. 
  
14.2    The Market Price applicable to Crude Petroleum lifted in the course of a Quarter shall 
be calculated at the end of each Quarter under consideration, and shall be equal to 
the weighted average of prevailing prices obtained by the Contractor and the State in 
the course of their sale of Crude Petroleum to Third Parties in the course of the 
Quarter under consideration, adjusted as appropriate to reflect differentials in quality 
and density, and on the terms of F.O.B. delivery and payment terms provided the 
quantity sold in such manner to Third Parties in the course of the Quarter under 
consideration corresponds to no less than thirty per cent (30%) of the total of the 
volumes of Crude Petroleum extracted from the Exploitation Perimeters existing 
under this Contract, taken as a whole, and sold in the course of the said Quarter. 
  
14.3     If such Third Party sales do not take place during the Quarter under consideration, or 
if they constitute less than thirty per cent of the total of the quantities of Crude 
Petroleum of the Exploitation Perimeter granted under the present Contract taken as 
a whole and sold in the course of the said Quarter, the Market Price shall be arrived 
at by comparison with the « Current International Market Price » for the Quarter under 
consideration of the qualities of Crude Petroleum produced in Mauritania and in 
neighboring producing countries, taking into account differentials of quality, density, 
transport and terms of payment. 
  
« Current International Market Price » shall be a reference price based on Dated 
Brent prices, as such are published in ‘Platt’s Crude Oil Marketwire’ or similar 
internationally recognised publication, averaged for the month(s) during which sales 
were made and adjusted for differences in quality, API gravity, terms of FOB delivery 
and payment terms. If Dated Brent is replaced by another internationally recognised 
reference crude, the published quotes of the replacement crude shall be used 
instead. 
  
14.4     In particular the following transactions are not taken into account in calculating the 
Market Price of the Crude Petroleum: 
 
a) Sales in which the buyer is an Affiliated Company of the seller as well as sales 
between entities making up the Contractor; 
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b) Sales which include some consideration other than payment in freely-convertible 
currency or sales attributable in whole or in part to motivations other than the 
usual economic incentives attached to sales of Crude Petroleum on the 
international market (such as barter contracts, sales from government to 
government or to governmental units). 
  
14.5     A committee presided over by the Minister or his delegate and including other 
representatives of the State and those of the Contractor shall meet at the request of 
its president, at the end of each Quarter, to establish, according to the stipulations of 
this Article 14, the Market Price of the Crude Petroleum produced, applicable to the 
Quarter elapsed. The decisions of the committee shall be by unanimous vote. 
  
If no agreement can be reached by the committee on a decision within a time period 
of thirty (30) days after the end of the relevant Quarter, the Market Price of the Crude 
Petroleum produced shall be definitively determined by an expert of international 
reputation, appointed by agreement of the Parties, or, if such agreement is not 
reached, by the International Centre for Expertise of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. The expert shall establish the price according to the stipulations of this 
Article 14 within a time period of twenty (20) days after his appointment. The costs of 
expertise shall be shared equally between the Parties. 
  
14.6     While awaiting the determination of the price, the Market Price provisionally 
applicable to a Quarter shall be the Market Price of the preceding Quarter. Any 
necessary adjustment shall be made not later than thirty (30) days after the 
determination of the Market Price for the Quarter under consideration. 
  
14.7     The Contractor shall measure all the Hydrocarbons produced after extraction of water 
and connected substances, in utilising, with the consent of the Ministry, the 
instruments and procedures in conformity with the methods in force in the 
international petroleum industry. The Ministry shall have the right to examine such 
measures and to check the instruments and procedures utilised. 
  
If during the course of exploitation the Contractor wishes to modify such instruments 
and procedures, he must obtain the prior consent of the Ministry. 
  
If, during the course of an inspection carried out by the Ministry, it is verified that the 
measuring instruments are inaccurate and exceed the acceptable tolerances, and 
that this condition of fact is confirmed by an independent expert, the inaccuracy in 
question shall be considered as having existed for half of the period since the 
preceding inspection, unless a different period is demonstrated. The accounting of the 
Petroleum Costs and the shares of production and liftings of the Parties shall be the 
subject of appropriate adjustments within thirty (30) days following receipt of the 
expert’s report. 
  
14.8     For Dry Gas, the provisions of this Article 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis, subject to 
the provisions of Article 15 here below. 
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Appendix C 
 
Amu Darya Basin Oil Tender of 2011, Ministry of Mines, Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 
 
11.1 Formula Price for Liquid Hydrocarbons. The Formula Price for the Liquid Hydrocarbons 
produced and saved from any Field in the Contract Area in any Month shall be determined in 
accordance with the following formula: 
 
 P = U + (B-U) * (1 + 0.15139*AP-B – 0.1434 * SP-B – T – D 
 
Where 
  
 P      is the price of the Liquid Hydrocarbons produced and delivered to the Delivery  
                    Point (US$ per Barrel);  
 
 U     is the average of the Platt’s Prices of Urals crude oil for the Month in question 
                    (US$ per Barrel); 
 
B     is the average of the Platt’s Prices of Dated Brent crude oil for the Month in 
question (US$ per Barrel); 
 
AP-B is the difference between the API degrees of the Liquid Hydrocarbons produced 
and 38.3 degrees; 
 
 SP-B is the difference between the percentage of Sulphur content of the Liquid  
                   Hydrocarbons produced and 0.4 per cent; 
 
T     is the deemed transport cost of the Liquid Hydrocarbons produced (US$ per 
Barrel), determined in accordance with Section 11.3; and  
 
 D    is the amount of the initial production discount (if any) on the price of the Liquid 
Hydrocarbons produced (US$ per Barrel), determined in accordance with 
Section 11.4. 
 
For purposes of calculating the average monthly Platt’s Price, the Platt’s Price for any Day of 
the Month means (i) in the case of Dated Brent crude oil, the average of the high and low 
spot prices for such crude oil as quoted for such Day in Platt’s Crude Oil Marketwire (Spot 
Assessment Section, Dated Brent Assessment) and (ii) in the case of Urals crude oil, the 
average of the high and low spot prices for such crude oil as quoted for such Day in Platt’s 
Crude Oil Marketwire (Spot Assessment Section, Urals MED Assessment). Transportation 
costs shall be reviewed every two (2) Years after the Initial Exploration Period according to 
Section 11.3, and the other coefficients and parameters in the Formula Price shall be 
reviewed by the Parties at the conclusion of the Initial Exploration Period and then every four 
(4) years thereafter. 
…………. 
11.3 Transport Costs. During the Initial Exploration Period, T in the formula set forth in 
Section 11.1 shall have a value of five US Dollars (US$ 5.00) per Barrel for Liquid 
Hydrocarbons produced from each Field in the Bazarkhami and Kashkari Blocks and seven 
US Dollars (US$ 7.00) per Barrel for Liquid Hydrocarbons produced from each Field in the 
Zamarudsay Block. Thereafter, the Parties shall meet at least once every two (2) Years to 
negotiate in good faith any adjustments to T that may be appropriate based upon then 
prevailing conditions regarding transportation costs for Liquid Hydrocarbons originating from 
each Field and the applicable Delivery Point for use in determining the Formula Price. 
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